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Fueling the
Superpowers

Potential Hazard
for U.S.-China
Relations

This article by Travis Tanner is
taken from the proceedings of the EPIIC
Symposium at Tufts University,
February 2005

I

n February 2005 crude oil futures prices jumped to exceed $51 a barrel.
In conjunction with terrorist risk premiums, China’s surging demand for
oil is a major driver behind the soaring prices. In fact, since the beginning of
2000, China has accounted for 40 percent of the growth in world oil demand.
Oil is an essential ingredient in China’s successful formula for economic
growth, especially owing to the fact that China is at an oil-intensive stage of
development. It is critical for driving industrial activity, generating power,
constructing infrastructure projects, and fueling the rapidly growing number
of automobiles on Chinese roads. Today there are 25 million vehicles on the
road and that number is projected to double by 2010 and reach 150 million
by 2020. China’s domestic oil production is flat, and therefore, in order to
meet its growing appetite, China has been a net oil importer since 1993.
Today, imports comprise 35 to 40 percent of China’s total oil consumption,
growing 31 percent in 2003, and by 2020 some estimates put China’s dependency on foreign oil as high as 70 percent. As the rapidly growing economy
further expands and the populace becomes wealthier, demand for oil will
continue to swell.
Oil consumption in the United States, the world’s largest consumer of
petroleum, is expected to grow nearly 50 percent over the coming twenty
years. Beijing, also on the fast-track to oil dependency, is currently on a
search to secure energy sources across the globe. This quest, in addition to
China’s heavy reliance on Middle Eastern oil (roughly one-half of its imports come from there), suggests a potential rivalry between the United
States and China over access to oil-rich regions. Many analysts argue that
the trajectories of the world’s two most voracious oil consumers will inevitably lead to a clash over the scarce resource.

Travis Tanner is Deputy Director and Assistant Director of Chinese Studies, the
Nixon Center, and author of The Oil that Troubles U.S.-China Waters.
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Will the United States and China actually square off in a war for resources sometime during the first half of the century? The potential for a
coming collision over the world’s limited oil reserves does, in fact, exist. But
several essential considerations must be examined before drawing such a
conclusion.
First, until recently, China’s energy strategy has appeared disjointed,
often fixed on multiple mutually exclusive objectives and quite often designed to meet political ends at the expense of economic considerations. As
a result of instability in the Middle East and the need to maintain economic
growth as a means to achieve social stability, however, Chinese authorities
have recently approached the nation’s energy policy in a fundamentally new
way. Foremost, in contrast to the long-standing strategy of advocating selfreliance supplemented by oil imports from the Middle East, Beijing has
embarked on a diversification strategy both in terms of the development of
alternative fuels and the establishment of new oil-import markets. In the
PRC’s State Council November 2003 report, it was officially declared that
China plans to pursue an energy development strategy focused on securing
“a diverse energy mix.”
Examples of Beijing’s desire to reduce its dependence on foreign oil and to
expand its energy mix include the following: the recent move to solicit bids
on four newly proposed nuclear power reactors, increased oil imports from
its current importers, such as, South Africa, Iran, Oman, Sudan, Angola,
Vietnam, Yemen, Indonesia, Russia, Kuwait, with special focus on boosting
imports from Central Asia, Russia, and Africa. Additional examples include:
the ongoing construction of three large liquid natural gas projects along the
Chinese coast, plans to establish a strategic petroleum reserve, plans to
increase offshore exploration, and continued interest in the construction of a
number of pipelines (Kazak; Russia; Turkmenistan). CNPC has acquired oil
concessions from Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, Peru, and
Azerbaijan.
One example that clearly illustrates Beijing’s relatively recent shift toward and focus on energy security policy is the recent decision to move
forward on construction of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline. In 1997, at
the time the original agreement was made, the 3,000-kilometer pipeline
from Kazakhstan to China made little commercial sense when compared to
the alternative of having oil imported from international markets and
delivered to China’s eastern coast via tanker. The deal instead was part of
Beijing’s strategic efforts to partner with Central Asian nations to protect
against potential proindependent uprisings along the Xinjiang border as
well as to counter growing U.S. presence in the region. In fact, after seven
years, only the first 400 kilometers of the pipeline had been completed. The
recent push to finish up the second, much larger, section of the project
demonstrates Beijing’s latest yearning to lock in new energy supplies and
diversify away from Middle Eastern oil.

231

New England Journal of Public Policy

Second, technological advances in the oil industry and the development of
alternative energy sources will allow, over time, energy users to become
more efficient and decrease their overall reliance on oil. As China’s
economy expands further, competitive enterprises will develop and adopt
new technology, which will result in more efficient energy use. Presently,
China is well behind the United States in energy efficiency. In 2001 China’s
energy users spent $151 billion, approximately 13 percent of GDP as compared to the United States where energy use comprised only 7 percent of
GDP.
No one knows when Earth’s remaining oil deposits will dry up, but almost
all experts agree that before mid-century the world’s oil supply will “peak”
— marking a change from an increasing supply of cheap oil to a dwindling
supply of expensive oil. Therefore, the technological advances required
shifting away from oil reliance toward substitutes such as natural gas,
hydropower, biomass, and other renewables are not only welcome but
necessary. In the future, when the cost of developing and utilizing alternative energy sources equalizes with the cost of oil use, simple economics will
drive rapid progress in these areas. Oil dependency will decline as it becomes more economical to take advantage of alternative energy sources. In
fact, the United States Department of Energy forecasts a decline in oil prices
from current prices well over $40 a barrel today to $27 in 2025 as a result
of new exploration and production technologies as well as alternative
sources of energy.
The third factor to be contemplated when analyzing the likelihood of a
future U.S.-Sino oil clash is the dynamic bilateral relationship these two
powers share. Since dialogue began in the early 1970s, progress on strategic, political, cultural, and commercial levels has flourished and resulted in
a very strong, mutually beneficial relationship. As a sidebar, it is interesting
to note that Colin Powell remarked on several occasions that U.S.-China
relations are the best they’ve been in thirty years; while in China recently, I
had several officials and scholars comment that the current state of U.S.China relations has reached a level of maturity not previously obtained.
During the Bush administration, two strategic points of convergence have
arisen: North Korea and terrorism. For example, in the realm of commercial
ties, the United States has become China’s second largest trading partner
while China has become the United States’ third largest trading partner.
The large number of shared interests not only provides incentives for avoiding a showdown over a single limited resource, but also provides multiple
spheres in which cooperation and diplomatic arrangements can be worked
out. In fact, last summer the two nations agreed to launch the U.S.-China
Energy Policy Dialogue, which will expand energy related interactions and
cooperation between the world’s two largest energy consumers.
So the question remains: Will growing demand for oil sour the U.S.-China
relationship to such a degree that a collision is inevitable? I contend that
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China’s newly evolving energy strategy, technological progress in the oil
industry and the increasingly robust bilateral relationship make this claim
unlikely.
I do believe the potential for this rivalry certainly exists and that energy
concerns could prove to have a significant negative impact on the relationship. I’d like to enumerate a couple of points that illustrate this:
1) In its current pursuit to secure energy resources, China has adopted a
mercantilist or almost zero-sum approach. Beijing perceives the United
States as encircling and pursing a containment strategy against it. It is
worried about sea lane security — for example, were a crisis to break out in
the Taiwan Strait, it fears the United States would cut off vital sea lanes —
such as the Straits of Malacca — which would cause major oil supply
disruptions. Furthermore, China is concerned by the large and likely longterm United States presence in the Middle East — to a degree, it buys into
the argument that the United States was driven by oil concerns to invade
Iraq; China sees itself operating outside the large multinational oil corporations based in the United States and is afraid of the implications of this.
Moreover, Beijing views the relatively new and robust American military
bases in Central Asia and long-standing U.S.-Japan alliance as potential
threats and part of an effort to contain China. There are mixed messages in
the Chinese response to the Angarsk to Nakhodka pipeline on the one hand
and the Kazak-China pipeline on the other. This perception of being threatened and encircled by the United States is aggravated by energy concerns
and has detrimental effects on the state of the bilateral relationship and if
continuously fueled, over a considerable amount of time, could develop into
a serious hazard for bilateral ties.
2) Another geopolitical consideration is China’s increasing involvement with
nations the United States deems unfriendly like Sudan and Iran. The Chinese
signaled strong opposition toward the proposal in the UN Security Council
in 2004 to implement sanctions on Sudan. In light of the fact that China and
Iran recently signed a $75-100 billion oil and gas deal, what would be the
implications for U.S.-Sino relations if the United States were to propose
taking similar actions toward Iran? This is a hot spot that has the potential
to flare up and cause major damage to the relationship.
3) Certain Americans have found China’s recent efforts to secure energy
resources in Canada and Venezuela (the United States depends on both for
one-quarter of its oil imports) as a Chinese attempt to sneak into the United
States by a back door and deemed this behavior as potentially threatening
to U.S. national interests. Additionally, CNOOC has considered purchasing
Unocal — an American oil company — a move that could add fodder to the
“China threat” fire in the United States. The proposition really makes sense
because the company mainly does business in Asia but this could stir up a
backlash on Capitol Hill.
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What Can the U.S. Do?
1) First and foremost, it’s not in the United States’ interest to have an
energy- starved China.
2) The United States can help China slow down its demand growth —
should cooperate on new technology and promote efficiency. U.S.-China
Energy Policy Dialogue is a step in the right direction. The forum’s aim will
be to increase collaboration in high energy and nuclear physics, fossil
energy, energy efficiency and renewable energy, and energy information
exchanges (pollution-free hydrogen; nuclear fusion; natural gas; oil recovery
technology).
3) Move forward and encourage regional cooperation in Asia to reduce
angst over supply disruption. The United States should promote the formation of an entity like an Asian IEA.
4) The United States should also take steps to further strengthen the existing
bilateral relationship across the board including the realms of economics/
commercial; diplomacy; cultural; security. Should take whatever additional
measures needed to dispel the notion that the U.S. is encircling China.

What Can China Do?
1) Tax fuel consumption more effectively.
2) Leapfrog to cleaner cars.
3) Tighten up restrictions on vehicle efficiency.
4) Migrate to gas as soon as possible.
Maintaining a robust economic growth is seen as a top priority by the
leadership in Beijing. Economic growth is key to job creation, job creation is
key to maintaining social stability, and, of course, social stability is key to
ensuring the CCP’s authority and legitimacy.

This presentation material is based on an article written by Travis Tanner entitled, “The Oil
that Troubles U.S.- China Waters,” Asian Times Online (www.atimes.com), June 18, 2004.
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